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Abstract
The financial crisis (setting in since 2007) focuses attention
on the regulation, while the self-regulated market shows imper-
fection at the market. In the last decades the deregulation was
the key-word, but nowadays everybody desires for new rules and
regulations. The article tries to present this complex subject re-
garding the banking regulation. There will be demonstrated the
pros and cons concerning the regulation, the practice regarding
the actual regulation and the possible solutions as regards the
developing.
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1 Introduction background of the crisis
Last years we could observe a recession in all sectors of the
economy all over the world (from the USA over Europe to Asia
as well). Certainly all countries began to face the problems, but
the signs and the level of difficulties are fairly different.
The signs of the crisis extended from sector to sector.
Economists forecasted the arrival of the economic crisis based
on the periodicity of economic growth and recession as well.
Earlier there has never been such a long prosperity in the world
as it was until nowadays. The crisis could not have been avoided,
but the proportion, the degree and the period of the problems and
disadvantages were influenced by the direct efficient causes.
Thirty-forty years ago dollar could not be exchanged for gold;
therefore the floating rate of exchange was introduced in most
countries. Twenty-thirty years ago the world tried to regener-
ate itself after the crisis due to the oil-price-explosion. In the
nineties prosperity took wing, so the privatization, globalization,
liberalization and deregulation could gain ground. So the rules
of the neoliberal principles governed the economy and world.
We emphasize the word: govern, since the solution seems to
be the governance as well, but governance by the governments
and not by the market itself. But keep in mind: a modern and
global economy cannot function without credit and financial in-
stitutions.
Recognizing the signs, facing the facts, analyzing the pro-
cesses and progresses and looking for the solutions are the most
important tasks at the beginning of the crisis. The financial sys-
tem is the nervous system of the economy; therefore the eco-
nomic crisis takes steps to the financial crisis as well. This Fig. 1
shows the correlation of the processes.
As Stiglitz said the American economy was admired by the
nations of the world and the American economists suggested
giving power to the markets. Now this period has been closed
and there is no respect for America and the American model,
since they think that they have to suffer for America(n model)
[7]. The high level of consumption in America was maintained
by resources of the mortgage credit that was financed by the
savings of the Middle and the Far East. The Americans have
to reduce their consumption to the level of their income. Nev-
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Fig. 1. From self regulation to regulation
ertheless, the participants of the American financial sector have
to accommodate themselves and their approach. “The majority
in America did not vote to throw out the capitalist baby with
the bankers’ bathwater” [6]. The above mentioned economists
summarize the main conclusions of crisis regarding (mostly) the
American market, society and getting a solution to find the way
out.
This article provides an overview of the milestones in bank-
ing regulation, summarizes relevant criticism on and the weak-
est points of control, and mentions the effects the financial crisis
has on regulation and touches upon new requirements and chal-
lenges. Nevertheless there are some open questions. What will
also happen during the crisis? What have happened during the
crisis to institutions not applying CRD/Basel II? Do they have
enough capital for the necessity improvement as regards the re-
duction because of the crisis? Could the CRD/Basel II earlier
and broader application have helped regarding the depth of the
financial crises? Is appropriate the capital requirement main-
taining liquidity, solvency and profitability? We try to reply to
them.
2 Necessity of the banking regulation (The magic tri-
angle. Conflicts of solvency, liquidity and profitability.)
2.1 Bank as the special company
Given their roles in the economy – as financial intermediaries
-, banks have for decades been regulated significantly more rig-
orous than those of other corporations. After the gold standard,
in which banks were handling money, evolved a credit based
monetary system, where money is a payment promise by bank-
ing system. Cash is by central banks and money as deposits
is by commercial banks. In the case of a bank failure deposits
are perished and on the other hand payments and settlements
are endangered. This system is the circulation of an economy.
Accordingly, disruption in this system – same as a stroke for a
person – triggers serious problems. A stroke in the payment sys-
tem may be caused by a technical error either the illiquidity of a
bank or the insolvency of an institution. Banks have a key role
in the operation of payment system, which is the reason they are
supervised and controlled by the government.
The essence of supervision is to obligate credit institutions to
considerate and prudent operations. Banks do not only maintain
the liquidity of the economy, they finance the different economic
activities as financial intermediaries. Meanwhile they take and
transform risks and their earnings arise from this risk manage-
ment process. These profit oriented institutions provide public
services as well (operation of monetary system). Primarily they
strive for profitability and not to serve commons. If banks, tak-
ing part in payments and settlements, provide besides the typical
commercial banking services investment and other financial ser-
vices (universal banking) their prudent operations will be endan-
gered. Additionally not only the owners / shareholders expect
higher and higher profits from them, but the prudential regula-
tion is based on the same logic as well. Banks need to increase
capital to expand risk taking and to enhance their earnings. The
source of capital is profit since the source of profit is risk tak-
ing. Consequently the general good (sound money by safety
payments and settlements) is endangered by greed and concern-
ing is profits. Banks, due to their liquidity and lender function,
are able to enforce their interest one-sided.
2.2 Arguments for deregulation – free banking
The two pillars of regulation are represented by the gov-
ernment’s safety net and prudential control. While the former
stands for measures and guarantees such as the national banks’
lender of last resort function or the institutions of deposit in-
surance, the latter comprises requirements on risk assumption,
capital accumulation, asset concentration and liquidity. With
regards to regulations on banking – in terms of methods and
extent of control – there has been an ongoing debate amongst
economists for decades [3]. Advocates of the so-called free
banking1 believe that the regulation of banks – similarly to the
way other industries and sectors operate – could be left to the
market. In the core of their argument are those conscious bank
managers who are perfectly aware that the key to long-term prof-
itability is to retain client confidence, which in turn calls for a
”conservative” lending policy and the maintenance of adequate
levels of capital and liquidity. In addition, they raise attention
to moral risk factors inherent to regulation – especially govern-
ment guarantees and aids. This reasoning is due to the fact that
1The standpoint of free banking advocates can be best understood through
the works of Kevin Dowd.
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the management of a given bank may very well be inclined and
willing to undertake riskier investments in the hope of higher
returns. Such managers may consider risks as opportunities of
potential gain, which could indeed have a positive effect on both
the bank’s profitability and shareholder wealth, while securing
the managers’ positions and bonuses as well. And whenever
there is "trouble" – when an investment or exposure plummets –
they can all anticipate support from the central bank, functioning
as a last resort. This methodology and its inherent moral risks
jeopardize, through interbank relationships and by means of the
adaptive behaviour of depositors and other account holders, the
stability of both the economy and the financial system. Individ-
ual issues, therefore, may bear an impact on the liquidity and
reputation of other banks and could even lead to an overall loss
of trust in the banking system as a whole. It is exactly the trans-
mission of problems; this high level of exposure to contagion
is what those promoting regulation are against. As Calomiris
(1999) [2] also states, the elimination of negative effects and ex-
ternalities resulting from the bankruptcy of a bank – or from a
crisis in the banking system – come at such high costs that it
is the government’s obligation to take whatever measures possi-
ble, in order to minimize the likelihood of a bust taking place.
In addition, advocates of regulation like to point out that without
legal regulation, market participants could never be fully confi-
dent about having corporate governance of banks that is able to
subsume their profit maximization goals to safe operation and
reasonable risk assumption.
The debate between free bankers and advocates of regulation
has been going on for decades, yet regulation does exist and is in
a process of continuous evolution. Nevertheless, the dispute is
but unnecessary, as regulators in the past few years have shifted
towards the market: they are now aiming to launch and utilize,
based on general consensus, legislation that better suits the risk
profile of institutions and is based on the best practice of banks
with the most experience in risk.
2.3 Milestones of bank regulation
The past few decades have seen significant changes in the fi-
nancial sector worldwide. After the ’80s the deregulation of fi-
nancial services industry enhanced the paradox between the re-
quirement of financial stability and institutions’ profit oriented
behaviours. The financial deregulation – whose culmination was
the repeal of Glass-Steagall Act in the US – resulted that finan-
cial institutions are allowed to provide more and more services
(for example: insurance and speculation in investment sector)
for their higher and higher profits. This could trigger crisis in
banking system and its consequences – primarily the absence
of confidence in financial institution and in the legal currency –
may occur currency crises.
Increases in both the turnover of money markets and the
cross-border flow of capital, technological development as well
as the expansion of financial services available have resulted in
the amplification of risks that financial institutions are now will-
ing to take. Parallel to this, the number of bankruptcies had risen
during the last third of the 20th century. All these events called
for regulation that, instead of earlier, quantitative rules (such as
the interest rate cap), is based on the risk undertaken. Creating
a new foundation for control was attributed to the Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)2. In 1988, within the
framework of the Basel I Capital Accord and as one of the re-
sults of the Committee’s work, the so-called 8% Cooke-ratio, or
capital adequacy ratio, was established.3 This accord links the
credit risk assumed by banks and the capital level of credit insti-
tution (capital requirement of credit institutions). While ensur-
ing the convertibility of the balance sheet items and off-balance
sheet items, these were weighted by different risk weights (0,
20, 50 and 100%). So minimal capital requirement of credit in-
stitutions was defined in 8% of the sum of risk-weighted asset
items. This relationship is expressed by the capital adequacy
ratio, which is the fraction of own funds and the sum of the risk-
weighted asset items. This capital accord of 1988 represents –
by the emergence of the concepts of solvency margin and capital
adequacy ratio – the basic pillar in prudential regulation.
Basel I considered credit risk to be the bank’s principal risk,
although from the late ‘80s onwards it was becoming clear that,
due to the propagation of off-balance sheet items and different
derivative-transactions, the role of market risk is also signifi-
cant. In 1993, the Basel Committee formulated a proposal to de-
fine funds to be raised in order to cover market risks inherent to
the banks’ trading activities on the money- and capital markets.
The need for a separate management of portfolios and portfolio-
elements that are affected by market risk was put into focus. For
this purpose, the trading book is used, which – just as its name
suggests – includes repurchase securities and derivatives (pur-
chased for trading). In 1996, the Basel Committee amended the
Recommendations on market risk with the opportunity for credit
institutions to define capital adequacy based on internal models.
Ever since its establishment, the Basel I has been target to
many criticism and the need for its refinement has been getting
more and more support from both financial institutions, super-
visory authorities and regulators. Most of this criticism had to
do with the weights applied at the calculation of risk-weighted
asset items, since these weights only served to indicate that an
item was riskier than another, instead of actually showing that an
activity with a 100% risk weight carries five times as much risk
as the one with a 20% risk weight. A great shortcoming of the
Basel I Accord was that it failed to take into consideration the
advantages that result from diversification. Moreover, the no-
table 8% is originated the empirical experience of crises in the
2 Standards formulated by the Basel Committee are only recommendations,
thus each country is entitled to adopt them to their respective legal system and
practice at their own discretion. Agreement by BCBS mentioned in the article
have been adopted, at least in part, by every country in the world – including the
US, Japan, Canada and the members of the EU.
3 Named after Peter Cooke, the first head of the Committee. Cooke-ratio,
Cooke-Committee.
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‘80s. Due to deregulation and liberalization as well as convert-
ibility, payment system and capital have changed. It is obvious
that in a dynamic environment and in different financial models
with different risk the suitable extent of capital adequacy could
not be standardized. As the new millennium was approaching,
the need for renewing the prudential regulation emerged.
1999 saw the birth of the first version of the new capital ac-
cord – the Basel II –, which only became finalized by 2004,
based on suggestions and comments received from numerous
participants in global finance. Instead of representing uniform
concepts of the regulators, this new accord is built on the best
practice of institutions providing the most outstanding perfor-
mance. It also provides a greater level of freedom for banks in
their assessment of capital requirements by the applicability of
own experiences, internal models and methods.
Basel II. is based upon the following pillars:
• Minimum capital requirements in reference to credit-, market-
and operational risk
• Supervisory review
• Market discipline
With reference to risks defined within the first pillar – that is,
to credit-, market- and operational risks –, institutions need to
define their regulatory capital. Depending on their own risk as-
sessments and management profiles and levels of development,
banks may choose from different capital adequacy calculation
methods, so they can use either internal models to determine ex-
posures and necessary capital. A common feature of methods
is that, as opposed to earlier practices, they provide a more ac-
curate snapshot of risks, whereas differences can be detected in
the levels of standardization, that is, what are those risk param-
eters (probability of default, loss given default etc.) that can be
defined by the bank and there are constant. The second pillar of
the new accord deals with the expansion of scope and responsi-
bility of supervisory authorities. These authorities are required
to review the banks’ processes of capital adequacy calculation
on a regular basis, as well as their risk positions and the ratio
of calculated capital requirement versus the risk assumed. The
third pillar aims to enforce market rigor and lower the asym-
metry in the spread of information amongst market participants.
This is resulted in the widening of the range of information to
be made public and the aspects of disclosure requirement were
changed too. By amplifying the effects of one another, stipu-
lations of the three pillars motivate institutions to operate more
transparently and securely and utilize more advanced methods
of risk management, thereby allowing for more effective regula-
tion.
Based on the Basel rules, the Capital Requirements Directive4
(CRD) was adapted in summer of 2006 and the contents of it are
4 The Capital Requirements Directive comprises Directive 2006/48/EC and
Directive 2006/49/EC.
applicable to all EU member states. Its regulations became ef-
fective as of January 2008 only in part, as some of its provisions
took force in January 2009. The United States has opted for a
limited application of the new regulation (Basel II): only its ten
largest – internationally active – banks are required to utilize the
most advanced (internal ratings-based) methods for the calcula-
tion of capital.
3 Regulation regarding the globalization and Basel
3.1 Globalization, deregulation and conflicts of them
The economies of scale, the efficiency and the aim for the
best possible solution have been developed to the level of glob-
alization. These processes and the mechanisms (as the supply-
demand) were self-regulated; this means that markets are self-
regulated. Since the processes can regulate it, the rule of legisla-
tion was eliminated, deregulation emerged. Overproduction and
over-supply in one sector generate themselves in all others too
and after the boom the production in the sectors reduces. The fi-
nancing demand reduced from sector to sector, so the possibility
and the amount of the profit in the financial sector radically fell
down. Therefore banks began to find other solutions to finance
firms and retail at a higher level of risk as well and to realize
profit.
The excessive, fast and polished-off deregulation of the finan-
cial sector enabled the bubbles to be born. In addition to it, the
controls in the application of the existing rules in the financial
legislation was remiss. The role of the supervisory authorities
came up for discussion, but the opinions of experts are same, that
the supervisory authorities cannot be blamed for any element of
this financial crisis. The supervisory authorities took measures
to reduce the risks and increased transparency, but their possi-
bilities were at a minimum level. The legislation was basically
permissive and based on the neoliberal principles inadequate.
The leverage appears through the subsidiaries, cross border
merges, acquisitions and investment portfolios. The subsidiaries
suffer and suffer losses because of the financial instability of the
parent undertaking. The cross border merger and acquisition
presents the same problems, but the different economic environ-
ment can influence the general effect.
The full repercussion of the financial crisis triggered by bad
mortgages in the United States is still unclear, but the unfore-
seen effects already include an unstoppable demand for greater
transparency in financial markets and for better regulation. Ras-
mussen [5] phrased the two main milestones of the possible way
escaping from crisis.
The neoliberal economics are based on self-regulated mar-
kets and laissez-faire principles. Overproduction, credit expan-
sion, extreme indebtedness etc. were not able to adjust and re-
cover the market processes. The power relations of global econ-
omy and resource allocation in the world were modified. Earlier
Brazil, China, India and Russia were only developing countries
and they were at the periphery of the world economy. Nowa-
days these countries are influential for the global economy. At
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the same time the confidence in credit institutions was broken. It
is important to say it loudly, since the liquidity crisis and the liq-
uidity risk were reduced and avoided, but the confidence should
be restored. The financial and governmental help were signifi-
cant and inescapable, but the confidential crisis is not rejected.
Publicity and transparency seem to be banality, but are the only
possibility to rebuild trust in the financial sector and the financial
institutions. The appropriate information should be available in
time and in a correct and suitable way. Therefore publicity and
transparency should be promoted in the financial sector as well.
The states bear a part in the financial sector as owners only.
It should be changed. The position of the states should be al-
tered from owner to regulator. Legislation should be compre-
hensive and expansive. The main point is taking into account
global financial risk. This means that the possibility of mutabil-
ity should be inserted into legislation as well. If the global mar-
ket or a sector or only one (observable) part of a sector changes
significantly then the financial institutions have to adjust it ei-
ther it is advantageous or not. There are several general rules
for risk management. These would be regulated in detail and in
a more controllable way. The credit limits would be rigorously
restricted.
3.2 Critics and challenges
By giving them a larger elbow room for the allocation of capi-
tal requirements, the main goal of regulation is to motivate credit
institutions for the highest possible level of risk assessment.
This allows for the strengthening of the banks’ risk sensitivity
and their sense of responsibility regarding risk assumption. Re-
lated to the higher level of risk assessment and management is
the goal of reinforcing stability in the financial sector, which is
to be reached by enhancing the transparency of the functioning
of institutions and by the deployment of a stricter supervisory
control.
The above-mentioned sounds very specious and, as the main
objectives for regulation and supervision, can be applicable even
in today’s financial turmoil. The question is how and by what
means can risk consciousness, corporate governance, prudent
and transparent operation and an alert supervisory body be made
possible. That is to say, the Basel II – as well as the CRD – has
several shortcomings. In the following, we summarize some of
them.
The scope of Basel II focuses attention on internationally ac-
tive banks. The scope of CRD contains all credit institutions and
investment firms. The main reasons are saving the competition
and since in Europe the credit institutions are mostly universal
institutions, therefore this extended scope could not be avoid.
As the crisis evolved it has become clear that some institutions
do not possess adequate capital levels that are in proportion with
respective risks assumed. One part of it is the inaccurate risk
weights and the absence of enough prudent rules. Another part
of it is that the new prudent rules (Basel II) were not applied
widespread. Nevertheless according to the Basel Committee,
one of the most critical areas is that risks related to trading book
items are accounted for and covered inadequately. This was fur-
ther enhanced by the spreading of complex financial instruments
(CDOs)5 that were less transparent and harder to appraise and
qualify, thus increasing the risk of the institutions and financial
system. With reference to the assessment and management of
market risk and the definition of its capital requirements, the
Basel II brought upon little, if any, change in comparison with
prior regulations. For instance, it failed to deal with securitiza-
tion that appeared in the activity of credit institutions in large
volume and had a key role in the deepening of the crisis. In this
area, the Committee is proposing the introduction of different
restrictive measures – such as subjecting securitization to cer-
tain terms and conditions – and an increase in both transparency
and disclosure obligation. The CRD descends some particulars
regarding the securitization, but the circumscription, the defi-
nitions and the methods are not eligible and adequate. Accu-
rately, the products, the leverage, the rules and the practice have
changed during the preparation of the CRD and the last version
could not represent the necessary content and correlation. Fur-
thermore the CRD is a compromise of 25 member states. These
countries are so different that many times the last version of the
directive contains contradictions and inconsistency as well. Un-
fortunately, regarding the securitization the CRD has to face this
case.
Another main defect of the regulation is that it excessively fo-
cuses on individual institutions, whereas the disclosure of sys-
tem risks remains in the background. The application of stress
tests allows for the analysis of system risks, within the frames
of which the effects that large-scale and extreme fluctuations of
market/financial variables (such as the drastic drop in real estate
prices) have on portfolios and on the exposures of institutions,
can be observed. Such stress tests could have been conducted
also for liquidity risk, in order to find out the consequences of
price increase and the exhaustion of interbank sources. If super-
visory authorities and regulators had paid particular attention to
liquidity risk, they could have prepared for the assessment and
management of this lack of trust and liquidity that emerged in
interbank markets around the globe [4].
According to Barth et al. [1], one of the main problems re-
garding the Basel guidelines is that these seek to substitute (re-
place) the markets by means of utilising complicated methods.
Adapting these complex methods presents significant costs to –
especially smaller and mid-sized – banks. The problem turns
back to the trouble of the scopes. The scope of Basel II contains
only the internationally active banks, therefore the application
of the complex methods cannot be inconvenience. The CRD is
applied to all credit institutions and investment firms, but the
basic model was adapted to the larger institutions. Moreover,
it shifts a greater level of responsibility to supervisory author-
ities as well, since their effective operation calls for employ-
5 Collateralised Debt Obligation.
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ing supervisory professionals possessing an overall, yet detailed
knowledge of different methods of risk assessment and capital
requirement calculation. Overly complicated rules and methods
may obfuscate the attention from assumed risks in concern (as
seen in the LTCM crisis in 1998). Another objection highlights
a contradiction of the Basel II accord in that, although a sys-
tem of regulations applicable on an international scale, it is to
be implemented and supervised on a national level. Therefore,
instead of considering the mitigation of system risks in the bank-
ing system as of primary importance, it focuses on the detailed
presentation of methods suitable for the assessment of capital
requirements and ignores the necessity for a supervisory entity
of a cross-border jurisdiction.
The different rules in the countries cause problems at supervi-
sion of the cross-border financial groups and conglomerates. In
EU this contradiction is more significant, since the CRD is ap-
plied compulsory, but it contains many permissive rules. There-
fore the national legislations can be different enough. Since in
EU the CRD disposes of supervision on a consolidated basis,
but the different rules can complicate the practice of this super-
vision. The responsible supervisory authority is the authority of
the parent institution, but the applicable law regarding the sub-
sidiary is the law of subsidiary’s country. The European Com-
mission and regarding some cases the supervisory authorities
would like to reduce the number of the national discretions, but
the governments of the Member States oppose the integration,
because they would not like to reduce the possibility of the de-
cision.
The CRD in the states of the European Union applies the rules
of disclosure which is the 3rd Pillar of CRD. There are special
rules for credit institutions and investment firms, since these in-
stitutions manage the customers’ funds, debits and resources.
The new rules of the 3rd Pillar in CRD obligate the disclosure
rules to the public. Much information is available from the in-
stitutions. These are new rules, so the comparability and history
of the information are inadequate, but in a few years it will be
solved. This is significant, but the regulators need to do more.
Nevertheless, the role of it would be important regarding the
subprime mortgage lending as well. Since this is a new rule it
is not established that it has a power regarding the institutions,
but the possibility of the retardation emerges concerning the sub-
prime mortgage lending. For example if the investor could know
much more about the institution and the particular transaction as
regards the background of the SPV then the investor who is the
final risk taker of the repacked credit could decide the realization
of these information.
The role and the application of the special purpose vehicles
(SPVs) would be sharpened. Since the SPVs issued promissory
notes collateralized by their structured securities which were is-
sued originally, the level of leverage is too much and the real
collateralisation is problematic. The activity of the SPVs would
have to be limited and controlled deeply.
We are talking about the necessity of the regulation and we
emphasized the significance of changing in the approach of reg-
ulation level. Nevertheless we have to underline the opposite
statement and process to it as well. The liberalisation and the
deregulation has been criticized by us, but the raison d’être is
unquestionable. For example the short selling was wanted to
forbid, but the primary function of this type of transactions is
important and basic in the life of financial sector.
It could be listed as one of the causes of the financial crisis
that supervisory authorities – along with numerous market par-
ticipants - were not aware of the composition and risk of struc-
tured products, thus they were unable to mark out the key points
of supervision: exactly what, in what aspects, and with what
tools should be examined when analyzing the risk exposure of
institutions. This is why it is of crucial importance that, in the
future, a greater emphasis should be attributed to the cooperation
between market participants, regulators and supervisory author-
ities, in addition to making requirements on structured products
more rigorous. It is essential that institutions are involved not
only in the opining on draft recommendations but in the uncov-
ering of problems as well, for they may provide useful advice
that could contribute to the maintenance of risks between man-
ageable levels.
In addition to the above, several other deficiencies and needs
for change have been formulated against legislative provision
currently in effect. This, however, do not necessarily mean that
soon we will be studying the draft of a Basel III, yet it serves as
ample proof that regulation must adjust to changes in its opera-
tional environment.
Nevertheless there is a main problem of the Basel II namely
the lack of extension to all over the world. The implementation
of Basel II is not compulsory, but the concerned countries com-
mitted themselves to the introduction. Unfortunately the mem-
ber states of the EU have entered into force the new legislation
based on Basel II, but the other countries defer to step. On the
one hand this difference destroys the competition. On the other
hand more rigorous rules can defend the institutions, their coun-
terparties and clients against the deepening of the financial cri-
sis. In Hungary we believe the advantages of the implementation
of the new capital requirement.
3.3 Credit rating agencies
There are interesting characters of the present events: the ex-
ternal credit rating agencies. Credit rating is used by the banks,
the investors, the companies and all participants of the capital
market. Users know that there are differences in the credit rat-
ings and analyses were made for order (sometimes in addition
it was rating shopping) or individual initiated by the agency. At
the same time credit rating agencies had to modify the grades
of securities and issuers from investment category. The market
was and is full of mortgage notes and their transformation in the
securitization. The scandals regarding credit rating agencies and
their analyses prejudice the trustworthiness of them. Instead of
it the reliability and credibility are (one of) the most important
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elements of stability in the financial sector.
The basic pillar of one part of the CRD is the rating of the ex-
ternal credit rating agencies (ECAI). The standardized approach
is based on the rating of the ECAIs, but the trustworthiness of
them has been fallen down. The re-establishment of the trust-
worthiness is avoidless, which is based on the regulation of
them. Till then the supervisory authorities have great respon-
sibility, since the doubtfulness would not be spread to the user
of the products of ECAIs (to financial institutions using stan-
dardised approach).
The credit rating agencies would be and will be regulated.
The European Union has been planning the concept of the leg-
islation for them for years. Now the negotiations with the USA
are progressive, so the principles of the new EU directive for the
credit rating agencies are sketched. The credit rating agencies
will have to give more information about the analyzed financial
construction. They will have to publish their system of consid-
eration and analyses. Independent experts would be sent into
the supervisory board and the agencies would not have licences
to give advice, since the classification and the counsel exclude
each other.
So the role of governments is determinant. The governments
(and supervisory authorities where they have regulatory power)
have to take steps and have to enforce new important acts and
degrees. Time is an important factor, so delay can cause further
damage.
3.4 Procycle behaviour
An increasing demand against banking regulation is to ease its
procyclical effects. In the case of an overheated economy, reg-
ulation often generates further expansion, just as it can further
deepen the crisis during a recession. According to Zsámboki [9]
banks are optimistic in period of boom, thus they are prone to
lending besides lower (possibly overvalued due to a bubble of
assets prices) collateral requirements and lower risk premiums
as well as they do not cover enough their expected losses by
provisions. During a “bust” period these problems are emerged.
Banks have higher provision obligations which influence their
profitability and capital level. Additionally institutions cut back
their lending activities; even the high quality clients (with low
probability of default) may not be financed. Due to this phe-
nomenon the banking sector enhances the economic downturn
and could trigger even a credit crunch or a system wide crisis.
Regulation, therefore, has a clear impact on economic growth
and financial stability, thus it is significant to know the ways and
the tools that are used by us for coordinating the risk assumption
and operation of institutions.
3.5 Discussion of Takenaka’s reform suggestions
Takenaka in his article [8] presents eleven reforms that can
block the tendency of financial markets to stampede:
1 adjust capital ratios to the level of lending measurement
2 benchmarks without a herd behaviour
3 mark-to-market rules on the duration of liabilities
4 leverage limits taking into account the funding cycle
5 extend suitability rules to all financial sector
6 enforce cross-country consistency
7 experiences at regulators and at regulated institutions
8 eliminate conflict of interest in the business models of rating
agencies
9 professionalize external directors
10 consolidate settlement of OTC trading and credit default
swaps
11 standardize cross-border collateral arrangements.
We can agree with points 2, 3, 5, 7, 8 and 10. Relative reference
indices should not be used as a benchmark. The benchmark
should be based on the efficiency, as indicated in point 2. Tak-
enaka says regarding point 3 when an institution relies mostly
on long-term liabilities then the assets regarding the mark-to-
market principle need not be strict and frequent, but in the event
of short-term liabilities the assets would be strict. The statement
is not disputable. The capital market rules extend broadly cus-
tomer protection through the adequate amount information and
prospectus rules. These principles would be extended to other
parts of the financial sector as well, as it is said in point 5. Point
7 determines the power of the experiences. The regulator inves-
tigates and supervises the institutions, but without real and accu-
rate experience the results are uncertain. Therefore professional
experience has to be obtained by the supervisor. One possibility
is a 6 months skill in one or two financial institutions. In Great
Britain there is a similar programme and the supervisory au-
thority significantly supports the skills and the acquirements at
financial institutions. As mentioned above, sometimes the rating
agencies work to issuers, so the trustworthiness of analysis and
the category is more than doubtful. The rating agencies must
publish the qualifying process. Point 10 is a trivial statement
and the market participants have been waiting for it for a long
time.
Point 6 is true and false in one. The European Union is a typ-
ical example for it. The single market and the EU legislation
support and enable to reach the consistency in the financial mar-
ket, but it is sometimes only dream-world. The EU legislation
contains many permissive rules (the typical phrase: the institu-
tion may apply), so sometimes the final version of the text and
the implemented legislation are far from the ideal version.
The establishment of point 11 is important and true, but the
implementation can be queried. The rules are not uniform and
one part of the legislation without the whole (at least which be-
longs to that) legislation cannot be fully standardized.
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Point 9 has two contrary opinions. It is true that external ex-
perts can see the company and the processes unbiased, but the
calling and the commitment are missing.
Point 4 talks about limits regarding leverage. The principal
is that the leverage limits of the financial institutions should be
increased when the economy is in recession. In our opinion the
liability of the decision and the determination of the leverage
level are not contractible. The levels and the measurements are
relative and the reaction of the forced limit can cause greater
problems than the original effort. The same thoughts come up
regarding point 1. The time of the reaction is unknown, but slow.
The supervisory authority has to recognize the tendency and has
to react on the effects as well. The financial institutions are the
adverse parties, but the information is on at them. Therefore
foreshow is doubtful and the chance of the accurate estimation
is low.
4 Conclusions
A new wave of regulation?
Bringing up the liability of the bank sector is meaningless.
Time and again the antibank-opinions (opinions against banks)
restart especially at the period of crisis. Under these circum-
stances Brecht is citable, since the foundation of the bank is a
more aggravated criminal offence than the bank robbery. The
banks as the profitability companies (based the procyclic be-
haviour) do their best and they give credits during the prosperity,
but they keep back the credit supplement during the recession.
If the excepted return reduces taking consideration into the tra-
ditional bank services, than the financial innovations, construc-
tions of the pilot-game and the moral hazards for the costs of the
public benefit.
The better regulation is a key element of the European Union
and the principles of its legislation. Therefore we do trust that
the better regulation (which tries to reduce the unnecessary obli-
gations and rules) and the anti-neoliberal opinion (the govern-
ments have to intervene to the automatic operation of the self-
regulated market) will be balanced and effective.
The supervisory authorities have to co-operate concerning the
cross-border groups and activity. The regulators (if they are
the governments) have to work together with the supervisory
authorities and market participants, since the practices and the
knowledge are divided among them. Furthermore it could help
the faster revival and reinforce the confidence in the financial
sector as well.
Regarding the credit institutions the regulators at international
level would have to calibrate the methods and the approaches
again. It could be that another ratio or index can represent more
adequately the financial safety net concerning the prudential reg-
ulation. The new approaches should insert to the models that
one approach does not fit for all, therefore they have to pay at-
tention to different institutions, activities, countries, economic
and financial environment.
The regulation of the banking operation is not enough. The
liberalization in other parts of the financial sector influences
the banking sector as well. The deregulated capital market
presented some deficiencies, since the short selling, the struc-
tured products and other transactions belonging to the deriva-
tives causes many problems and much loss for the market par-
ticipants, supervisory authorities and regulators as well.
The leaders of the Group of Twenty (G 20), in London sum-
mit, agreed to strengthen financial supervision and regulation,
whose deficiencies were one of the main causes of crisis. They
emphasized the need of greater consistency and systematic co-
operation between countries towards restores financial stabil-
ity. According to the agreement of the G20 regulatory oversight
should/will be extended to credit rating agencies. International
practices/guidelines/standards are desirable to eliminate the con-
flicts of interest (issuers and not investors pay for ratings) and
to ensure the understanding rating decisions. The higher trans-
parency, their accountability are desired by market participants.
In addition the profitability as one of their major principles is
also worth considering.
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